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ABSTRACT 
 
Do the physical settings in which a voter casts their ballot affect their vote choices?  Every state 
uses a variety of polling locations for the administration of election: churches, schools, libraries, 
fire stations, and etcetera.  The literature on priming effects and voting is massive, but very little 
research examines the impact of the venue in which a ballot is cast has on voters’ decisions.  In 
this study I argue that polling venues situated on church, school, or veteran’s association 
property influences the proportion of votes cast in favor of ballot measures related to each 
institution.  I test these hypotheses using precinct level election results and population data from 
California’s 2008 general election and find results supporting, or suggesting, such a relationship. 
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Introduction 
 Every year millions of Americans spend countless hours reading newspapers, searching 
websites on the Internet, watching television news coverage and campaign advertisements, 
however willingly, to determine how to cast their ballot on Election Day. In an attempt to ensure 
the polling locations at which these voters participate in this democratic experience are 
environments of comfort that are sterilized of politically charged distractions many states and 
local governments have prohibited acts of campaigning in or near these democratically hallowed 
grounds. The states of Georgia and New York, for example, prohibit campaigning or the 
presence of campaign signs within 100 feet of the front door of a polling location. Voters are not 
allowed to wear campaign buttons or t-shirts when standing in line to cast their ballot. Similarly, 
the state of Ohio prohibits such behavior within 50 feet of the building in which voting takes 
place. The effectiveness of such action, in some circumstances, may be questionable as new 
research suggests that the polling locations themselves may affect voter decision making.  
 Thus, for the voting experience to be free and clear of external distractions and provide 
the contexts for voters to make political decisions in an environment that promotes rationality, it 
stands to reason, polling locations themselves must not be a source of affect. The purpose of the 
paper is to investigate and draw conclusions regarding the impact polling locations have on vote 
decisions. To do this I will examine how polling stations located at various locations affect vote 
choice on ballot initiatives in California’s 2008 General Election.  
Review of the Literature 
 The field of political behavior has a well established tradition in which voters and other 
political actors are viewed by principal investigators and political theorists as being rational and 
strategic actors. These models conceptualize the voter as a utility maximizing agent whose 
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engagement in, or abstention from, political action is the result of some calculation. From the 
decision to vote or abstain (Riker & Ordeshook 1968) to selection based upon the calculation of 
the utility differentials between candidates or political parties under various electoral scenarios 
(Downs 1957), the voting behavior literature is teeming with these rational choice models.  
 The past thirty years have seen a strong break from these normative models of economic 
rationality toward a research tradition more solidly based in social and cognitive psychological 
theory. The literature on priming effects in political decision making is vast. It has been 
demonstrated that priming from media sources can affect the orderings of issue importance 
(Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Carpentier2002), political attitudes and political 
priorities have been shown to be affected by news media (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Krosnik & 
Kinder 1990; Nelson Clawson & Oxley 1997), the alteration of evaluative criteria and approval 
of political elites and candidates for political office (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnik and 
Kinder 1990), as well as an alteration of attitudes on racial issues (Valentino, Hutchings, and 
White 2002).  
 In addition to the priming literature there is a well established field of research regarding 
the use of heuristics in voting. Though the rationality of using heuristics is a topic of continuous 
debate, the empirical reality in which political decisions are made exhibits frequent use of such 
cognitive shortcuts throughout the population. In the case of ballot initiatives, and other items 
found further down the ballot, heuristics have been shown to be of great importance (Lupia 
1994). Lupia’s (1994) seminal work on heuristics and decision making on ballot initiatives 
shows that while voters may not come to the polls armed with an encyclopedia of information on 
the often complex ballot measures with which they face on election day, they are likely to make 
the “correct” decision if they simply know which side of the ballot measure various interest 
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groups align themselves. Tying Lupia’s work to this paper, when evaluating relatively 
complicated, and often new, information on the spot with the intent to make a voting decision 
people do not conduct a search of all relevant information stored in their memory. Rather they 
rely on accessible and existing constructs that have already been built within their minds. The 
physical space in which a person casts a ballot may serve as an activation mechanism of such a 
heuristic. Thus, in this particular research paper, the physical building in which a voter casts their 
ballot possibly provides a very transparent and accessible heuristic for one to tap, consciously or 
not, when making voting decisions.  
 Despite the vast amounts of research investigating various models of decision making 
and the effects of influence from various sources there is reason to believe that other 
psychological mechanisms may determine the way in which voters cast their ballots. The 
priming research covered above, which suggests that observable behavior can be influenced by 
the external stimuli, is now a topic covered extensively in the political psychology literature. 
Research on the relationship between polling locations and vote choice is rather new, but the 
psychological mechanisms at work are relatively well established.  
 One particular piece of recent research has investigated the affect polling locations have 
on vote choice. Berger, Meredith and Wheeler (2008) use data from Arizona’s 2000 General 
Election to determine whether voting precinct polling venues located in schools prime voters to 
cast their ballot in favor of a ballot initiative, Proposition 301, that proposed increasing state 
sales tax rates to finance an increase in spending on education. The results indicated that there 
were, in fact, significantly higher proportions of votes cast in favor of Proposition 301 from 
polling locations situated in schools compared to other venues. An experiment conducted in a 
computer lab, in which participants assigned to the treatment condition are shown pictures of 
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high school lockers and other common scenes one would encounter when walking through a 
school followed by a questionnaire to gauge support for measures similar to Proposition 301, 
further supports the finding that the environment in which a voter casts their ballot can affect 
vote choice.  
 Berger, Meredith and Wheeler base their argument from which they derive their 
hypothesis on contextual priming. Contextual priming has traditionally been studied in the fields 
of consumer and market research, but the implications of this research can be easily translated 
into political research. In one such study researchers set up displays for wines from two different 
countries, France and Germany. The treatment in this study was the type of music the researchers 
played, either classical French or German compositions, from the display and they found that 
shoppers purchased the French wine at a significantly higher rate when French music was 
playing as well as the converse; that shoppers purchased German wine at a significantly higher 
rate when German music emanated from the speakers at the display case (North, Hargreaves, and 
McKendrick 1999).  
 While there are no political undertones to be attached to this example in the literature, 
this example does demonstrate how seemingly meaningless environmental cues affect 
purchasing decisions. Thus, the contexts in which people are to make decisions may, to an 
extent, determine the decisions they make. On one hand the stimuli in the contextual priming 
research is teeming with environmental stimuli, but on the other hand each of this stimuli are 
engage sensory perceptions not of physical environment but rather music, as in North, 
Hargreaves, and McKendrick (1999), or the brand of briefcase an actor is carrying in a television 
commercial, as in Yi (1993).   
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 This same phenomenon exhibited in these veins of research bear striking resemblance to 
political research on the variation in responses to public opinion survey questions dependent 
upon the interviewer’s race, economic class, or the presence of other objects in the nearby 
environment (Lenski and Leggett 1960; Schuman and Converse 1971; Converse and Schuman 
1974; Schuman and Presser 1981).  The implications of this body of research are contentious as 
there is disagreement between researchers interested in the cognitive psychology, such as Zaller 
and Feldman (1992), as opposed to research focused on social interaction, such as Converse and 
Schuman.  Where the cognitive psychology camp argues that this effect is the result of the 
respondent’s lack of a “true attitude” regarding a survey question and they are merely responding 
to their environment at a particular time, the social psychology camp argues that social 
desirability bias arises between, essentially, two human beings engaged in a random 
conversation. 
Theoretical Foundations  
 There exists a body of research much more suited to act as a foundation from which to 
build a scientific argument that the physical location in which a person casts their ballot can 
influence their voting decision. Research on automaticity focuses more on the psychological 
relationships between environment and behavior (Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001; Ferguson and 
Bargh 2004). The suggestion of this line of research is that people automatically arrive at 
judgments or decisions without necessarily engaging in the expenditure of cognitive resources. 
To use the words of Bargh, Chen and Burrows, such research has shown that “trait concepts and 
stereotypes become active automatically in the presence of relevant behavior or stereo-typed-
group‖ and situational features (1996 pp. 230).” As an example, in Bargh, Chen and Burrows 
(1996) experimental participants are primed with words associated with, or synonymous to, 
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“impoliteness.” The words are embedded in an exercise in which participants in the treatment 
condition are to decipher a scrambled sentence then, when finished with the exercise, they are to 
bring their results to the proctor. All other details of the experiment aside, those participants 
primed with the words associated with impoliteness were likely to respond to requests and 
situations presented by the proctor in an impolite manner. Similarly, in another experiment, 
participants were primed with words tangentially associated with elderly people.  Words such as 
“Florida” and “bingo” were used to prime participants and these participants, upon completion of 
the exercise, were timed on how long it took them to bring their results to the proctor after 
finishing the exercise. Those in the treatment condition, on average, walked slower as a result of 
the priming condition.  
 The sum of the above literature illustrates that human decision making can be influenced 
by seemingly mundane details that, off hand, can go unnoticed to the conscious mind. Further 
research in social psychology links these environmental stimuli to behavior and the activation of 
socially desirable behavioral norms. A 2004 study by Kay, Wheeler, Bargh and Ross 
demonstrates specific behavioral norms are activated by specific location. This particular project 
involved the placement of treatment participants into a corporate setting to see how their 
behavior in negotiation games differed from control participants at an offsite neutral location. As 
expected those participants engaging in the negotiation game in a corporate setting acted in a 
manner that was more competitive and more generally characterized as the type of behavior in 
which the “corporate” type would acquiesce. In a similar vein Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) 
expected and found a relationship between norms of silence and presence in a library. It is a well 
known courtesy that one should be quite, whispering if verbal communication is at all necessary, 
when in a library. This is a behavioral norm typically taught to children upon their first visit to a 
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library and one that is enforced throughout their years of education; one would be hard pressed to 
find a library void of some sign requesting patrons to keep the volume of their voice to a 
minimum.  
 The take away from this literature is that humans have learned behaviors that can be 
activated, unknowingly, in their memory through the physical and social situation one perceives 
themselves to occupy at any given time. It stands to reason that if norms of silence are activated 
when one enters a library or norms of competitiveness are activated when one occupies a 
corporate setting that these psychological mechanisms will be employed in political situations. 
Theoretically, we should find that an effect similar to that found by Berger, Meredith and 
Wheeler (2008) exists when the voting venue is changed to a church, or religiously laden polling 
location, and the ballot initiative changed to some proposition of religious valence, same sex 
marriage and abortion rights for example. It just so happens that voting locations are situated in 
several types of buildings providing a good deal of variation from one precinct to the next and 
this offers excellent conditions to investigate the activation of situation-relevant norms by polling 
locations. We should expect the stimuli of different polling locations, and their environments, to 
act similarly in that they automatically activate psychological constructs priming voters to cast 
their ballot in a particular and specific direction. For the purposes of this paper, if theories of 
automaticity and contextual priming are to hold we should expect the proportion of votes cast in 
favor of the position associated with Christian doctrine, actual or popularly perceived, to be 
higher in polling locations that are churches or somehow related specifically and transparently to 
the Christian faith (i.e. convocation centers and community centers specified as areas of 
Christian faith-based activity).  Thus, a general hypothesis this research posits expects that 
polling places located in churches have a systematic impact on voter decisions, by priming voters 
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to think about ballot measures as moral issues. Specifically, I propose polling places located in 
churches influence the proportion of votes cast in favor of ballot measures that have received 
explicit endorsement or condemnation from prominent religious bodies.   I also expect to find a 
relationship between other polling locations and ballot initiatives that have latent relationships. 
Data and Hypotheses 
 To test my hypotheses I will be using elections and population data from the 2008 
General Election for the State of California. For a number of reasons, California, I believe, 
provides an ideal case in which to research aggregate polling place priming effects. A number of 
data conditions must be met for the purposes of causal inference. The most obvious data 
requirement concerns the types of polling precincts a political jurisdiction offers its voters as 
well as numerous ballot propositions or initiatives. Every state uses more than two types of 
polling locations, but ballot initiatives are another matter. To make causal claims that are to carry 
weight I must show that the polling precinct is causing the hypothesized voting behavior and that 
significantly higher proportions of votes favoring the position of institutional bodies are not a 
result of traits held by the population residing within a precinct. Thus, necessarily, there must be 
several initiatives proposed on the ballot for all voters in all precincts to decide on. This offers a 
straightforward evaluative criterion in which new dependent variables for each ballot initiative 
can be generated with the expectation that there will not be a significant relationship, in either 
the positive or negative direction, between polling locations situated in institutionally laden 
location and the other ballot propositions. Such relationships would potentially indicate that 
precinct population characteristics are determining the value of the dependent variable. In 
addition to the above listed considerations, it is important that the election chosen to examine be 
one of high salience as previous research has shown that elections with lower levels of interest 
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within the electorate tend to turn out those voters that are particularly motivated because of a few 
intense interests in the outcomes of the election (Kernell 1979; Patty 2006). The dataset used in 
this paper contains 10 of California’s 55 counties. The selection of counties was carried out 
through an ordering of counties by the number of precincts situated within the county (from 
highest to lowest) and then I proceeded to obtain data available online through each county’s 
board of elections on polling location addresses for the 2008 general election
1
.  
 California’s 2008 General Election fulfills each of the above data considerations. The 
2008 election cycle was of considerable salience and received the highest voter turnout, as 
measured by the proportion of the voting age population turning out to vote, since 1968 
(MacDonald 2010). The 2008 ballot in California asked voters, statewide, to decide on twelve 
ballot measures with considerable variation on topics
2
. There are four ballot initiatives from 
California in this election cycle that pertains to this study, Propositions 3, 4, 8, and 12. To state 
my hypotheses in operational terms: 
  H1: The proportion of votes cast in favor of passing Proposition 3 should be higher when 
 polling venues are located in primary schools than in other types of polling locations. 
 H2: The proportion of votes cast in favor of passing Proposition 4 should be higher when 
 polling venues are located in churches and other transparently religious institutions than 
 in other types of polling locations. 
 H3:  The proportion of votes cast in favor of passing Proposition 8 should be higher when 
 polling venues are located in churches and other transparently religious institutions than 
 in other types of polling locations. 
                                                          
1
 The counties are: Butte, El dorado, Humboldt, Imperial, Lassen, Madera, Mariposa, Placer, Sacramento  
2
 See Appendix A for list of ballot measures and official wording as seen on the ballot by California voters.  
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 H4: The proportion of votes cast in favor of passing Proposition 12 should be higher 
 when polling venues are located in veteran’s halls than in other types of polling locations. 
Furthermore, as a means of testing that the characteristics of precinct populations are not the 
cause of the expected increase in the proportion of votes cast in favor of each ballot measure I 
posit the following hypothesis:  
 H5: No precinct priming effects should be detected in evaluations of the proportions of 
 the vote cast for other ballot initiatives
3
.  
Methods  
 The nature of this particular study and its question lends itself to a number of methods, 
but I will be using aggregate level data for this specific piece. The unit of analysis in this paper is 
the consolidated voter precinct. Most polling locations serve several voter precincts, a 
consolidated precinct is a geographic unit composed of all precincts served by a single ballot at a 
single polling location. To illustrate by way of example, if precinct numbers 1, 2, and 3 all cast 
like ballots, by like ballot I mean that the precincts all lie within the same political jurisdictions, 
at the same polling location they composed a consolidated precinct (from this point forward the 
use of the word “precinct” should be interpreted as ―consolidated precinct‖). The numerical 
identification of consolidated precincts was generated by a statewide database housed at the 
University of California-Berkeley and is used by county election boards to identify the precincts 
within their own jurisdictions.  
                                                          
3
 I must add one exception to this hypothesis, that being the use of Vote by Mail (VBM) systems in various 
precincts.  Given the nature of VBM I am not able to discern what objects may be present when people cast their 
ballot by mail, nor from where they are actually making their vote decisions.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vote-by-Mail 1721 0.178966 0.383435 0 1 
Church 1721 0.241139 0.427899 0 1 
Primary School 1721 0.122022 0.327406 0 1 
Secondary School 1721 0.013945 0.117298 0 1 
Mason 1721 0.009297 0.095999 0 1 
Civic Center 1721 0.112144 0.315635 0 1 
Veterans 1721 0.016851 0.128749 0 1 
Country Club 1721 0.016851 0.128749 0 1 
Firestation 1721 0.062754 0.242591 0 1 
Library 1721 0.013364 0.114863 0 1 
Government Building 1721 0.037188 0.189277 0 1 
Mobile Home 1721 0.013364 0.114863 0 1 
Retirement Community 1721 0.026729 0.161336 0 1 
Misc. Private Residence 1721 0.081348 0.273448 0 1 
Prop 1a_Yes 1681 0.451192 0.111296 0.190476 0.727273 
Prop 2_Yes 1671 0.588441 0.089587 0.357143 0.817602 
Prop 3_Yes 1687 0.445811 0.09739 0.214286 0.797101 
Prop 4_Yes 1656 0.465816 0.114459 0.179415 0.820334 
Prop 5_Yes 1658 0.361198 0.100754 0.121951 0.632184 
Prop 6_Yes 1677 0.273916 0.065697 0.097967 0.461039 
Prop 7_Yes 1693 0.326238 0.069563 0.136364 0.538983 
Prop 8_Yes 1625 0.554283 0.137604 0.131579 0.882353 
Prop 9_Yes 1698 0.523351 0.075509 0.323944 0.733333 
Prop 10_Yes 1692 0.32929 0.082548 0.121951 0.564474 
Prop 11_Yes 1695 0.551309 0.072901 0.347475 0.734694 
Prop 12_Yes 1694 0.592946 0.069219 0.298592 0.78 
Democrat 1721 0.408307 0.130761 0 1 
Republican 1721 0.362521 0.156362 0 1 
Hispanic 1721 0.104046 0.119115 0 1 
Asian 1721 0.033193 0.038042 0 0.358156 
Age 18-24 1721 0.086047 0.067482 0 0.95709 
Age 25-34 1721 0.143843 0.080788 0 0.6 
Age 35-44 1721 0.1748 0.07034 0 0.666667 
Age 45-54 1721 0.23308 0.073462 0 1 
Age 55-64 1721 0.191308 0.067296 0 0.727273 
Age 65+ 1721 0.170873 0.121718 0 0.940171 
12 
  
 The dependent variables in this study are the proportions of votes cast in a precinct in 
favor of passing Propositions 3, 4, 8, and 12. To operationalize these variables I use precinct 
level election results data gathered by the Institute for Governmental Studies at the University of 
California - Berkeley. This database has been a source of voting and population data hosted and 
compiled by the non-partisan Institute of Governmental Studies at U.C. Berkeley for the 
purposes of legislative redistricting since 1981. Vote percentages by precinct are not included in 
this data; vote totals, however, are included. Thus I created the dependent variables by 
calculating the quotient of the total yes votes divided by the total ballots cast for, and against, 
each ballot proposition within a precinct. As a means to test Hypothesis 5 I generated vote 
proportions using this same simple yet direct method for all other propositions appearing on the 
ballot.  There were a considerable number of precincts with smaller populations that cast 100% 
of their ballots for or against a ballot measure, which is a phenomenon that is present in every 
initiative on the ballot.  To prevent the bias created by these highly homogenous districts from 
skewing my results I excluded those districts that lay two standard deviations from the mean on 
each ballot initiative from the data used to estimate each model. 
 My independent variable of interest is the type of polling location in which voters of a 
precinct cast their ballots. This data has not previously been collected by researchers nor is it 
housed in any centralized database. Rather, to obtain this data I visited the online archives of 
individual counties to extract “Statements of Vote” from each county and manually researched 
addresses of polling locations. Conveniently some of the counties identified the physical location 
as well as the address of the voting venue. Operationally these variables are dichotomous dummy 
variables created to identify the type of building used as the polling location for a given voter 
precinct.  The types of locations, listed by the variable name, are: Vote-by-Mail, Church, 
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Primary School, Secondary School, Freemason Lodge, Community Civic Center, Country Club, 
Fire Station, Library, Government Building, Mobile Home neighborhood, Retirement 
Community, and Miscellaneous Private residences.  Each variable is coded “1” if the location is 
represented by the indicated building, or “0” if otherwise. 
 There is considerable evidence to be found throughout political science literature that 
variables such as ethnicity, gender, age, ideology, income and education, amongst others, all 
affect the opinions, values and predispositions of political actors (e.g. voters). Availability of this 
data by precinct is scarce. The Statewide Database mentioned above does contain demographic 
data on ethnicity, age and party registration. Each of these variables are operationalized as 
percentages of the precinct population of registered voters using the precinct level data contained 
in the Statewide Database from the Institute for Governmental Studies at U.C. Berkeley. Rather 
than using these variables to control for hypothetical differential effects, given the inherent noise 
oscillated by aggregate level data, I use this data only to determine the exogeneity of polling 
location from population characteristics. To do this will simply regress each of these independent 
variables on a dependent variable for polling location to demonstrate that polling locations are 
assigned quasi-randomly, but namely that population characteristics do not determine the 
assignment of one type of polling location or another. At the heart of each of these small tests is 
an attempt to peel away the layers of noise inherent in the use of aggregate level data and to 
eliminate the possibility that there is selection bias in my model. Though it makes no theoretical 
sense to expect a person to include the location in which they will vote as a criterion for the 
selection of their residence the demonstration that these two variables are not correlated will 
invalidate claims of selection bias and demonstrate the quasi-random nature of selection in this 
study. Furthermore, exhibiting the absence of a correlation between polling location and party 
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registration statistics should also preclude claims that self-interested strategic actors are 
assigning polling locations to precincts based on a hypothetical assumption that the relationship I 
propose between polling location and voting decisions is not only real, but of electoral 
significance.  
Results  
 As stated in the section above, there is little reason to suspect that election officials assign 
polling locations based on precinct population characteristics. Nonetheless, to demonstrate the 
exogeneity of population characteristics, and thus assume them out of the model, I conduct 
regressions using polling location as the dependent variable and available demographics as the 
independent variables. Each of these demographic variables is continuous and given the 
relatively small size of many of these populations, I felt it is appropriate to use OLS to estimate 
bivariate relationships between polling locations and the demographics rather than breaking each 
variable down into an ordinal variable and estimating the relationships using a Chi-Squared test 
(see Table 3).  With few exceptions, nearly all relationships between population characteristics 
and polling location are insignificant.  Notable exceptions include party registration and the 
assignment of a precinct to vote-by-mail and to primary schools.  The possibility of bias 
generated by such relationships is small considering that those relationships present in the data 
move in the same direction for both political parties on both of these polling location variables.  
This is most likely the result how frequently vote-by-mail and primary schools are used as 
polling locations as they are the second and third most used types of polling location present in 
my data (see Table 2).  The remaining relationships between precinct ethnic populations and 
polling location have little bearing on this research as none of the locations with which a 
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significant relationship is present is a location of interest for my hypotheses and there is no 
theoretical explanation as to why such a correlation would exist. 
Table 2: Frequency of Polling Location Types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Given the limited resources provided for the administration of elections, it should come 
as no surprise that polling locations are not correlated with many of these demographic 
characteristics. The fact that precincts are consolidated so as to share a single polling location, 
which cuts down on the administrative costs of elections, lends some support to the idea that 
polling locations are probably determined largely on the convenience of the location. 
Additionally, there are no districts encountered in my data that are made up of only one precinct, 
nor are there any districts in which there is no variation of the polling location variable. The 
logical extension of this second consideration is that elections are won from aggregated results 
across all precincts within a district, and if polling locations were determined by a method in 
which electoral advantage was the primary concern, we should see districts with little or no 
variation on the polling location variable.  
Polling Location Frequency 
Vote by Mail 308 
Church 415 
Primary School 210 
Secondary School 24 
Mason 16 
Civic Center 193 
Veterans 29 
Country Club 29 
Fire station 108 
Library 23 
Government Building 64 
Mobile Home Community 23 
Retirement Community 46 
Misc. Private Building 140 
16 
  
Table 3: Bivariate Regression Estimations of Population Characteristics on Polling Location 
 
Standard Errors between parentheses:   *Indicates p < .05;  **Indicates p < .0
 Democrat Republican Hispanic Asian Age18-24 Age25-34 Age35-44 Age45-54 Age55-64 Age65+ 
Church .064 
(.162) 
.154 
(.138) 
-.007 
(.072) 
-.349 
(.230) 
10.388 
(15.29) 
10.59 
(15.27) 
10.27 
(15.28) 
10.25 
(15.28) 
10.22 
(15.28) 
9.94 
(15.27) 
1-School .465** 
(.116) 
.325** 
(.102) 
-.103 
(.053) 
.859** 
(.140) 
5.47 
(11.31) 
5.40 
(11.29) 
5.88 
(11.30) 
5.528 
(11.29) 
5.202 
(11.3) 
5.209 
(11.3) 
2-School .0389 
(.0437) 
.0262 
(.0372) 
-.009 
(.019) 
.088 
(.062) 
1.987 
(4.132) 
1.929 
(4.128) 
1.934 
(4.129) 
1.935 
(4.128) 
1.87 
(4.13) 
1.89 
(4.129) 
Veterans -.088 
(.05) 
-.064 
(.051) 
-.014 
(.021) 
-.088 
(.068) 
.004 
(4.54) 
-.01 
(4.53) 
-.091 
(4.53) 
-.032 
(5.54) 
-.048 
(4.54) 
-.062 
(4.54) 
Civic Center .128 
(.120) 
-.068 
(.103) 
-.071 
(.053) 
-.523* 
(.171) 
5.81 
(11.36) 
5.28 
(11.36) 
5.47 
(11.36) 
5.39 
(11.36) 
5.60 
(11.36) 
5.61 
(11.36) 
CountryClub .051 
(.048) 
.066 
(.041) 
-.023 
(.021) 
1.46 
(.068) 
1.47 
(4.55) 
1.58 
(4.54) 
1.47 
(4.54) 
1.47 
(4.54) 
1.47 
(4.54) 
1.50 
(4.54) 
Fire Station -0.045 
(.09) 
-.002 
(.077) 
-.079* 
(.039) 
-.108 
(.128) 
-1.85 
(8.51) 
-1.94 
(8.51) 
-1.71 
(8.51) 
-1.72 
(8.51) 
-1.67 
(8.51) 
-1.93 
(8.51) 
Government -.018 
(.073) 
-.114 
(.063) 
.06 
(.033) 
-.244* 
(.105) 
4.13 
(6.99) 
4.21 
(6.99) 
4.19 
(6.99) 
4.16 
(6.99) 
4.18 
(6.99) 
4.16 
(6.98) 
Library -.016 
(.043) 
-.024 
(.037) 
.005 
(.019) 
-.035 
(.061) 
1.18 
(4.06) 
1.19 
(4.06) 
1.24 
(4.06) 
1.23 
(4.06) 
1.19 
(4.06) 
1.20 
(4.06) 
Mason .006 
(.036) 
.029 
(.031) 
-.034* 
(.016) 
-.0492 
(.051) 
1.161 
(3.389) 
1.135 
(3.387) 
1.141 
(3.388) 
1.141 
(3.367) 
1.168 
(3.387) 
1.124 
(3.387) 
Misc. Private .091 
(.103) 
.102 
(.088) 
-.008 
(.046) 
.228 
(.147) 
-3.17 
(9.79) 
-2.87 
(9.78) 
-3.08 
(9.78) 
-3.20 
(9.78) 
-3.22 
(9.78) 
-2.94 
(9.78) 
MobileHome .018 
(.042) 
.013 
(.037) 
-.019 
(.019) 
.013 
(.061) 
1.39 
(4.06) 
1.39 
(4.05) 
1.36 
(4.06) 
1.38 
(4.06) 
1.36 
(4.06) 
1.42 
(4.06) 
Retirement .008 
(.061) 
-.014 
(.052) 
.004 
(.027) 
.03 
(.087) 
-3.91 
(5.76) 
-3.83 
(5.76) 
-3.91 
(5.75) 
-3.88 
(5.76) 
-3.93 
(5.76) 
-3.84 
(5.76) 
VBM -.617** 
(.147) 
-.290* 
(.125) 
.06 
(.07) 
.385 
(.21) 
-20.02 
(13.9) 
-19.86 
(13.87) 
-20.27 
(13.88) 
-19.58 
(13.87) 
-19.38 
(13.88) 
-19.13 
(13.87) 
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 After the elimination of population characteristics as meaningful systemic causal links, I 
then estimate bivariate regression models to test my hypotheses.  The results of these regression 
models are presented in Table 4.  Consistent with my first hypothesis, in which vote shares 
favoring Proposition 3, a measure to fund children’s hospitals, are significantly higher in primary 
schools my model estimates an increase of approximately 2% in favor of Proposition 3 in polling 
locations situated on the grounds of primary schools.  Related to this hypothesis, secondary 
schools move in the same direction, but the relationship between secondary schools and 
Proposition 3 is not significant.  While this increase of 2% is not large enough to flip the results 
of this particular election, it is large enough to flip to results of several precincts and is of 
considerable importance for the support of my argument.  
 Unfortunately the test of Hypothesis 1 is the only one in which the results bear out my 
expectations.  While there are not significant relationships between polling locations situated on 
the grounds of churches and vote proportions for Propositions 4 and 8, the model estimates a 
relationship in the correct, positive, direction.  This is also the result found for Proposition 12 
and veteran’s associations that are used as polling locations.  To begin with the latter, as you can 
see from Table 3, the number of veteran’s halls present in the data is comparatively low.  The 
relationship is in the positive direction and with a p-value of .266; this is most likely the result of 
statistic power issues.  This is obviously not the case with the results from my tests of 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 as the use of churches as polling locations is highly frequent.  That being 
said, these two ballot initiatives were two of the more salient propositions put before voters in 
the California election of 2008.  Table 5 presents the spending data from all groups engaging in 
the expressed advocacy of the passage or defeat of ballot measures in the 2008 election.  While 
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Table 4 : Bivariate Regression Estimations of Polling Location on Ballot Propositions 
 
P-Values in Parentheses
 Prop1a Prop 2 Prop 3 Prop 4 Prop 5 Prop 6 Prop 7 Prop 8 Prop 9 Prop 10 Prop 11 Prop 12 
Church -.004 
(.572) 
.002 
(.755) 
.0004 
(.953) 
.009 
(.127) 
-.0007 
(.918) 
.006 
(.208) 
-.008 
(.149) 
.012 
(.117) 
-.004 
(.469) 
.00001 
(.997) 
-.00007 
(.990) 
-.007 
(.202) 
1-School .125 
(.205) 
.001 
(.884) 
.02 
(.001) 
.009 
(.417) 
-.025 
(.008) 
.026 
(.000) 
.003 
(.717) 
.009 
(.466) 
.002 
(.756) 
.015 
(.068) 
.008 
(.256) 
-.026 
(.000) 
2-School .031 
(.269) 
.022 
(.356) 
.039 
(.144) 
.015 
(.613) 
.007 
(.799) 
.031 
(.096) 
.027 
(.204) 
.006 
(.869) 
.024 
(.247) 
.046 
(.044) 
-.008 
(.682) 
-.008 
(.0687) 
Veterans -.015 
(.564) 
.035 
(.110) 
-.018 
(.465) 
-.037 
(.171) 
.041 
(.088) 
-.031 
(.069) 
-.021 
(.263) 
-.042 
(.196) 
-.026 
(.182) 
-.005 
(.819) 
.009 
(.592) 
.0014 
(.266) 
Civic Center .017 
(.098) 
.006 
(.501) 
.004 
(.678) 
-.032 
(.002) 
.026 
(.007) 
-.019 
(.007) 
-.007 
(.370) 
-.042 
(.001) 
-.029 
(.000) 
-.007 
(.424) 
-.006 
(.403) 
.015 
(.037) 
CountryClub -.011 
(.662) 
-.015 
(.487) 
-.034 
(.160) 
-.014 
(.171) 
-.049 
(.591) 
-.012 
(.041) 
-.031 
(.504) 
-.013 
(.104) 
-.011 
(.694) 
-.041 
(.05) 
.033 
(.073) 
-.019 
(.284) 
Fire Station -.032 
(.016) 
-.022 
(.049) 
-.042 
(.001) 
-.011 
(.458) 
-.018 
(.164) 
-.016 
(.084) 
-.019 
(.053) 
.007 
(.696) 
-.003 
(.736) 
-.034 
(.002) 
.01 
(.302) 
-.017 
(.075) 
Government .076 
(.000) 
.05 
(.000) 
.079 
(.000) 
-.307 
(.078) 
.081 
(.000) 
.014 
(.210) 
.04 
(.001) 
-.076 
(.000) 
-.006 
(.593) 
.037 
(.006) 
-.037 
(.002) 
.049 
(.000) 
Library .044 
(.123) 
.034 
(.161) 
.009 
(.716) 
-.038 
(.203) 
.028 
(.302) 
-.004 
(.834) 
.008 
(.691) 
-.068 
(.061 
-.015 
(.493) 
.017 
(.465) 
.019 
(.361) 
.009 
(.636) 
Mason .021 
(.537) 
.018 
(.542) 
-.023 
(.409) 
-.102 
(.005) 
.033 
(.314) 
-.065 
(.005) 
-.045 
(.081) 
-.125 
(.004) 
-.097 
(.000) 
-.062 
(.026) 
.028 
(.266) 
.02 
(.402) 
Misc. Private .014 
(.237) 
.006 
(.572) 
.002 
(.847) 
.004 
(.730) 
-.019 
(.080) 
.019 
(.015) 
.0007 
(.993) 
-.006 
(.687) 
-.006 
(.488) 
.009 
(.308) 
.028 
(.001) 
-.013 
(.125) 
MobileHome -.049 
(.085) 
.0004 
(.987) 
-.014 
(.616) 
.035 
(.244) 
-.022 
(.404) 
.015 
(.453) 
-.019 
(.382) 
.047 
(.197) 
-.012 
(.566) 
-.005 
(.817) 
.009 
(.665) 
.016 
(.434) 
Retirement .011 
(.595) 
.017 
(.311) 
.022 
(.234) 
.0005 
(.844) 
.003 
(.862) 
.017 
(.200) 
.001 
(.946) 
-.011 
(.657) 
-.012 
(.419) 
.006 
(.737) 
.003 
(.860) 
.007 
(.623) 
VBM -.036 
(.000) 
-.022 
(.001) 
-.037 
(.000) 
.013 
(.119) 
-.015 
(.049) 
-.028 
(.000) 
-.0002 
(.976) 
.054 
(.000) 
.031 
(.000) 
-.013 
(.054) 
.0005 
(.925) 
.006 
(.257) 
Aggregated .004 
(.522) 
-.004 
(.375) 
-.005 
(.356) 
-.010 
(.127) 
-.003 
(.646) 
-.009 
(.015) 
.003 
(.435) 
-.012 
(.117) 
-.002 
(.659) 
-.009 
(.111) 
.002 
(.684) 
.005 
(.531) 
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 Proposition 4 was heavily financed, far more than Proposition 3 and Proposition 12, 
which had no registered campaigns, Proposition 8 drew more than $70million worth of campaign 
spending making it the second most expensive campaign in the United States during the 2008 
election cycle (the campaign for United State President ranking number one).  The coefficients 
for both Propositions 4 and 8 are in the expected, positive, directions and the p-values approach 
significance, but given the subtle theoretical effects hypothesized it is likely the case that the 
high saliency of both of these ballot initiatives mitigated the proposed polling location effects.   
 Lastly, I conduct another series of bivariate regression to test Hypothesis 5, that there 
should be no effects of polling location on the remaining ballot initiatives.  My first test, with the 
disaggregated series of each type of location on each ballot initiative offers results contradictory 
to my hypothesis as there are several significant relationships.  Many of these polling location 
types have few occurrences in the data and statistical power may be an issue.  Another possibility 
is that there are attitudes and other predispositions, such as public service or environment 
conservation, which are being primed and are not considered by this paper.  Support for the 
statistical power argument can be found by a new variable created post-hoc and labeled in Table 
4 as Aggregated and provides some evidence to support Hypothesis 5.  This variable is the 
aggregation of all polling locations without specific hypotheses and has only one significant 
relationship out of the twelve propositions.   
Conclusion  
 Consistent with the aforementioned hypotheses, polling location could have a significant 
impact on vote selection. Churches, schools, and veterans associations are highly symbolic 
structures and offer nearly every adult an easily accessible psychological construct to which they 
can attach, positively or even negatively, as a means to make decisions without the expenditure  
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Table 5: Spending on Ballot Propositions by Group (from California Sec. of State) 
Prop Group Support Oppose 
1a CALIFORNIANS FOR HIGH SPEED TRAINS $2,544,821.02  
 1a PIRG $67,186.00  
 2 CALIFORNIANS FOR HUMANE FARMS $10,314,025.44  
 2 CALIFORNIANS FOR S.A.F.E. FOOD 
 
$8,795,907.10  
3 CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION INITIATIVE FUND $6,892,201.24  
 4 CAMPAIGN FOR TEEN SAFETY 
 
$9,297,084.91  
4 FRIENDS OF SARAH $2,527,222.72  
 4 CAMPAIGN FOR TEEN HEALTH AND SAFETY 
 
$1,003,770.57  
4 CREDO VICTORY FUND TO DEFEAT PROP. 4 
 
$16,834.00  
5 NORA CAMPAIGN $7,577,697.07  
 5 PEOPLE AGAINST THE PROPOSITION 5 DECEPTION 
 
$2,870,657.48  
5 CAMPAIGN AGAINST PROPOSITIONS 4, 6, 8, 9 
 
$35,609.03  
6 COMMITTEE TO TAKE BACK OUR NEIGHBORHOODS $1,600,728.69  
 6 NO ON PROPS 6 & 9 
 
$2,331,308.75  
6 SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS ACT: YES ON PROPOSITION 6 $198,441.21  
 6 CAMPAIGN AGAINST PROPOSITIONS 4, 6, 8, 9 
  
7 
CALIFORNIANS AGAINST ANOTHER COSTLY 
 ENERGY SCHEME $29,787,573.70  
7 CALIFORNIANS FOR SOLAR AND CLEAN ENERGY $9,286,604.82  
 8 PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM - YES ON 8 $39,642,911.00  
 8 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE CALIFORNIA $1,856,193.33  
 8 NO ON 8, EQUALITY FOR ALL 
 
$43,027,785.59  
8 YES ON PROPOSITION 8 $125,022.34  
 8 EQUALITY CALIFORNIA ISSUES PAC 
 
$12,582,533.34  
8 FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL 
 
$74,401.52  
8 CALIFORNIANS FOR MARRIAGE $8,466.00  
 8 MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA ISSUES COMMITTEE 
 
$82,053.83  
8 CAMPAIGN AGAINST PROPOSITIONS 4, 6, 8, 9 
 
$35,609.03  
8 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 
SOCIAL JUSTICE FUND $591,687.90  
8 CALIFORNIANS FOR PROGRESS 
 
$1,134,747.83  
8 TASK FORCE CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE 
 
$275,779.14  
9 MARSY'S LAW: JUSTICE FOR CRIME VICTIMS $4,835,872.12  
 9 NO ON PROPS 6 & 9 
 
$2,331,308.75  
9 YES ON PROP 9 $272,693.76  
 9 CAMPAIGN AGAINST PROPOSITIONS 4, 6, 8, 9 
 
$35,609.03  
10 CALIFORNIANS FOR ENERGY INDEPENDENCE $22,859,347.25  
 10 CALIFORNIANS AGAINST THE $10 BILLION LEMON 
 
$182,009.38  
11 CALIFORNIA VOTERS FIRST $6,488,759.22  
 11 YES ON 11 - HOLD POLITICIANS ACCOUNTABLE $10,134,639.24  
 11 COMMON CAUSE FOR FAIR REDISTRICTING $118,526.56  
 11 CITIZENS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
$1,632,455.30  
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of cognitive resources. The model estimated in this paper provides mixed results that polling 
venues can affect support for direct democracy measures.  By no means are these results 
conclusive, they are, at least, however, highly suggestive that there is some phenomenon are 
play.  Moreover, the theoretical relationship presented in this paper lends itself quite intuitively 
to other methods of evaluations, particularly experimental research.  Aggregate data is, after all, 
full of noise, however precise and error free the observations happen to be, it is fallacious to 
make a causal claim regarding psychological mechanisms and their impact on voters’ decisions 
without cementing this finding with individual level research. 
 There is also reason to suspect a broader impact on voting decisions by the physical space 
one occupies when making such a decision. Conservative candidates and candidates that publicly 
express their attachment to a particular faith may experience a bump in their totals as a result of a 
higher percentage of church polling locations. There is also reason to suspect that schools and 
churches are not alone in their effect on voting decisions. Many polling locations are housed at 
local fire stations, conservation centers and state parks, and it could be argued that these physical 
spaces may prime voters to cast ballots in favor of environmental regulation, or spending 
increases for local emergency services and so forth. Norms and social desirability standards, as 
artificial as they may be, probably determine behavior in other ways as well. Candidate forums, 
town hall meetings, legislating, and protests are all conducted in physical spaces each with a 
different standard of decorum.  Political elites go to great lengths to deliver speeches at specific 
locations under assumptions that the location carries with it some symbolism that can deliver a 
level of tangibility to their message that would otherwise fall on deaf ears were such an appeal 
made from the podium in front of a press corp. Each of these considerations offers research 
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questions and realistic situations in which political scientists could observe and measure 
behavior.  
 Furthermore, if polling location impacts vote choice, there are questions to be asked 
about the efficacy of democratic procedures. Systematic biases in election results make the 
justification of democratic government difficult. It cannot be stated enough: more research is 
needed to determine the extent to which polling locations bias voting decisions. There are several 
policy prescriptions that may reduce this bias, namely the institution of vote-by-mail (VBM) 
systems. Despite the debate over the definitions of rational behavior, there is some consensus 
that what makes a voting decision rational is that the decision is made free of exogenous bias, 
and that it reflects the interests of the voter. VBM allows voters an opportunity to make their 
political decisions in the environments in which they experience the effects of the outcomes of 
elections.  
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Appendix A
4
 
Proposition 1a: To provide Californians a safe, convenient, affordable, and reliable alternative to 
driving and high gas prices; to provide good-paying jobs and improve California's economy 
while reducing air pollution, global warming greenhouse gases, and our dependence on foreign 
oil, shall $9.95 billion in bonds be issued to establish a clean, efficient high-speed train service 
linking Southern California, the Sacramento/San Joaquin Valley, and the San Francisco Bay 
Area, with at least 90 percent of bond funds spent for specific projects, with federal and private 
matching funds required, all bond funds subject to an independent audit? 
Proposition 2: Shall certain farm animals be allowed, for the majority of every day, to fully 
extend their limbs or wings, lie down, stand up and turn around? 
Proposition 3: Shall $980,000,000 in general obligation bonds be authorized for construction, 
expansion, remodeling, renovation, furnishing and equipping of eligible children's hospitals? 
Proposition 4: Shall the California Constitution be changed to prohibit abortion for an 
unemancipated minor until 48 hours after physician notifies minor's parent, legal guardian, or, in 
limited cases, substitute adult relative? 
Proposition 5: Shall $460,000,000 be allocated annually to improve and expand treatment 
programs? 
Proposition 6: Shall of minimum of $965,000,000 of state funding be required each year for 
police and local law enforcement? 
Proposition 7: Shall government-owned utilities be required to generate 20% of their electricity 
from renewable energy by 2010, a standard currently applicable to private electrical 
corporations? Shall all utilities be required to generate 40% by 2020 and 50% by 2025? 
Proposition 8: Shall the California Constitution be changed to eliminate the right of same-sex 
couples to marry providing that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California? 
Proposition 9: Shall notification to victim and opportunity for input during phases of criminal 
justice process, including bail, pleas, sentencing and parole be required? Shall victim safety be a 
consideration for bail or parole? 
Proposition 10: Shall $5 billion in bonds paid from state's General Fund be authorized to help 
consumers and others purchase certain vehicles, and to help research in renewable energy and 
alternative fuel vehicles? 
Proposition 11: Shall the authority for establishing state office boundaries be changed from 
elected representatives to a commission comprised of Democrats, Republicans, and 
representatives of neither party selected from the registered voter pool in a multilevel process? 
Proposition 12: Shall a nine hundred million dollar ($900,000,000) bond be issued to provide 
farm and home aid for California veterans? 
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